The new face of Terrorism... Bioterrorism

Terrorism intends as its primary goal to terrify, to fill or to overpower with intense fear, to intimidate to achieve an end. We do not call terrorist events "bomb-ism" or "radiation-ism" or "poison-ism" or "disease-ism" or "murder-ism." Terrorist phenomena derive their power from their ability to psychologically injure, manipulate, and control the behavior of individuals and populations.

A growing number of scientists are urging us to think about what would happen if two unseen, but powerfully destructive forces were combined: terrorism and deadly germs. The experts are talking about the threat of germ warfare. This is not a new threat, in many ways predates nuclear warfare, but the science of germs has become a great deal more sophisticated and sinister. it's important to remember that the germs used for weapons are engineered to be far more potent than the naturally occurring strains.

Again, it's important to remember that the germs developed for weapons are much stronger and less treatable than the naturally occurring strains; and to understand what terrorists might have, you need to know what might be available.

With the advent of the germ theory of disease, greater knowledge of microbiology, and militarybioengineering, the potential devastation due to biological weapons grew exponentially. In 1876, the German biologist Robert Koch first proved that anthrax is caused by bacteria. In World War I (1914–1918), biological weapons developed by the United States and Germany were perhaps used to contaminate animal fodder, and the Germans used Burkholderia mallei to cause glandersin enemy support animals. During World War II renewed concern over "germ warfare" fueled both sides' research regarding biological weapons, but there is no record of their being used. The height of the development of "weaponized" biological agents was the Cold War (1946–1991), in which both the United States and the Soviet Union created arsenals of biological agents for use both in battle and against civilian populations. This research led to propagandist charges of using such weapons; during the Korean War (1950–1953), North Korea accused the United States of dropping bombs containing diseased flies. Since the 1975 ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States, Russia, and most states have publicly claimed that they have destroyed their stockpiles and now research biological warfare only to defend against it. Even so, during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraq equipped, but did not fire, rocket warheads containing anthrax. Since the Gulf War we've learned that Iraq had chemical and biological warheads for hundreds of short and medium range weapons. Iraq started its biological weapons program 30 years ago, setting up the two-tiered production process that is considered to be the signature mark of any biological weapons program: there's the civilian tier, where the scientists create the germs, and the military tier where the weapons are developed to carry the germs.

An easy option?

An effective biological weapon is potentially devastating and much easier to make and transport than a nuclear weapon. Bio-weapons are, however, relatively safe for the terrorist. Pathogens (biological agents or germs) are virtually undetectable and can be brought reasonably easily into a country by an individual and can then be propagated in large quantities.

Biological weapons have been called "the poor man's atom bomb." By any measure, the economic outlay required to develop offensive bioweapons capabilities is significantly less than that of a nuclear program. Less is needed in the way of equipment and infrastructure. The materials themselves are less rare. And less is required in the way of specialized knowledge for the biological aspects, since much of the information can be found in the public domain. Worldwide, trained microbiologists overwhelmingly outnumber nuclear physicists. All these aspects tempt not only nations of concern, but also non-state actors. In fact, it seems far more likely that biological agents will be used by terrorists than by warring nations. Although the terrorist use of bioweapons is likely to occur on a reduced scale, it could have worldwide ramifications under unfavorable circumstances.

What about the flora and fauna?

I put this in just to remind you again about the problems of being not only humans as a target, but anti-livestock and anti-plant, and in Australia and places like New Zealand and elsewhere, this is an extremely sensitive issue.

For human Vaccines do exist for bacteria such as anthrax and plague, but supplies are nowhere near the levels needed to immunise whole populations, and in some cases the safety of the vaccines has never been properly evaluated. The best defence against such an attack is to prevent it from happening in the first place.

For the Soviet Union, the best biological weapons were biological weapons without any possible treatment and prophylaxis. Ebola was considered one of the best possible agents for biological weapons; Marburg, smallpox and huge number of attempts to genetically alter diseases like plague, anthrax, tuleramia. In the late '80s the countries were able to start developing new prototypes of bacterial biological weapons based on multi-resistant strains, meaning that all existing treatments available in the West wouldn't be possible to apply because these agents would overcome antibiotic treatments.

The world is largely unaware of, and therefore largely unprepared for, bioterrorist attacks. Bio-weapons threaten thousands of casualties in addition to other disastrous long term consequences. Criminal networks can covertly transport lethal agents across borders and terrorists have already proven that anthrax can be fatally deployed.

Bio-technology is undergoing rapid evolution. This process, and the wide dissemination of developments, is already proving difficult to manage. There is evidence that terrorist organizations have a heightened interest in the use of biological weapons, establishing terrorist support cells in different regions around the world with the ability and motivation to carry out attacks.

A comprehensive review of the problems posed by biological terrorism :-

1.Biological terrorism is more likely than ever before and far more threatening than either explosives or chemicals.

2. Official actions directed at the threat to the civilian population (less than 2 years in the making) have been only marginally funded and minimally supported.

3. Preventing or countering bioterrorism will be extremely difficult. Recipes for making biological weapons are now available on the Internet, and even groups with modest finances and basic training in biology and engineering could develop, should they wish, an effective weapon at little cost.

4. Detection or interdiction of those intending to use biological weapons is next to impossible.

Isn't there a law against it?

In many countries, criminal justice systems are constrained by inadequate legal frameworks governing the detection and repression of bio-weapons. Frequently, no law is violated until the disease or biological agent is actually deployed. Law enforcement officers are therefore unable to begin preliminary investigations into the development of such weapons. Without laws which criminalise activity relating to bio-weapons, there is no basis for legal assistance or co-operation to prevent their production and transport.

There is therefore an urgent need to ensure that countries are adequately prepared for, protected from, and able to respond to bioterrorism attacks. Law enforcement agencies have a crucial role to play, with significant support from, and in collaboration with a range of other national and international bodies.

Where do you stand?

Even with the technologic sophistication available in the World today, effectiveness in dealing with a bioterrorist event is limited. Current supervision systems may be inadequate to detect attacks. Because the onset of illness after exposure to an agent is delayed, even the time and location of the attack may be obscure. In addition, most of the medical community is unfamiliar with many of the high-threat diseases, so identification of the problem may be further delayed. Many of us who are involved in studying the many aspects of bioterrorism believe that it is not a question of if such an event will occur but rather when, as well as which agent will be used and how extensive the damage will be. Given the enormity of what is possible, we must prepare for a potential nightmare. 

The recent occurrence of a series of Swine Flu, Bird Flu and other newly evolved strains and also SARS demonstrates the need to educate emergency services personnel about how to best ensure patient and worker safety in the case of suspected exposure to biological threat agents. There are very few data to support the methods being used or the variation in current care. Emergency physicians, first responders, and hazardous materials response teams need a standardized approach to the management of patients who may have been exposed to biological threat agents. Early detection and rapid response to bioterrorism depend on close cooperation between public health authorities and law enforcement; however, such cooperation is currently lacking. National detection assets and vaccine stockpiles are not useful if local and state officials do not have access to them.